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Abstract
Recent work has demonstrated the vulnera-
bility of modern text classifiers to universal
adversarial attacks, which are input-agnostic
sequence of words added to any input in-
stance (Wallace et al., 2019; Behjati et al.,
2019). Despite being highly successful, the
word sequences produced in these attacks are
often unnatural, do not carry much semantic
meaning, and can be easily distinguished from
natural text. In this paper, we develop adversar-
ial attacks that appear closer to natural English
phrases and yet confuse classification systems
when added to benign inputs. To achieve
this, we leverage an adversarially regularized
autoencoder (ARAE) (Zhao et al., 2018a) to
generate triggers and propose a gradient-based
search method to output natural text that fools
a target classifier. Experiments on two differ-
ent classification tasks demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our attacks while also being less
identifiable than previous approaches on three
simple detection metrics.1
1 Introduction
In recent times, adversarial attacks have demon-
strated significant success in bringing down the
performance of modern deep learning meth-
ods (Szegedy et al., 2014). An adversary can
lightly perturb inputs to appear unchanged to hu-
mans but induce incorrect predictions by neural
networks. Adversarial attacks started out in com-
puter vision (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini and
Wagner, 2017) and have been recently explored
in several natural language processing (NLP) do-
mains (Jia and Liang, 2017; Ebrahimi et al., 2018;
Alzantot et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 2018b).
§Equal contribution
1Code is available at https://github.com/
Hsuan-Tung/universal_attack_natural_
trigger.
Universal adversarial attacks are a special sub-
class of methods where the same attack perturba-
tion can be applied to any input to the target classi-
fier. These attacks, being input-agnostic, point to
more serious shortcomings in trained models and
do not require regeneration for each input. While
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017) designed some of
the first universal attacks for image classification,
Wallace et al. (2019) and Behjati et al. (2019) have
recently demonstrated successful universal adver-
sarial attacks for NLP models. However, one limi-
tation of their methods is that the generated attack
sequences are often meaningless and irregular text
(e.g., “zoning tapping fiennes” from Wallace et al.
(2019)). While human readers can easily identify
them as unnatural, we also find that simple heuris-
tic methods are sufficient to spot such attacks. For
instance, the above attack trigger for sentiment anal-
ysis has an average word frequency of around 14
compared to 6.8k for benign inputs in the Stanford
Sentiment Treebank (SST) (Socher et al., 2013).
In this paper, we focus on designing natural at-
tack triggers by utilizing a generative model of
text. Particularly, we use an adversarially regu-
larized autoencoder (ARAE) (Zhao et al., 2018a),
which consists of an autoencoder and a generative
adversarial network (GAN), and generates natu-
ral text using input noise vectors. This enables us
to develop a gradient-based search over the noise
vector space for triggers with a good attack per-
formance. Our method, which we call Natural
Universal Trigger Search (NUTS), uses projected
gradient descent with L2 regularization to avoid us-
ing out-of-distribution noise vectors and maintain
the naturalness of text generated.
We demonstrate the success of our attacks on
two different classification tasks – sentiment anal-
ysis and natural language inference (NLI). For in-
stance, the phrase ‘she might not’, generated by
our approach, brings down the accuracy of a classi-
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fier trained on the Stanford NLI corpus (Bowman
et al., 2015) to a mere 1% on entailment decisions.
Furthermore, we show that our attack text appears
more natural than prior approaches according to
three different measures – average word frequency,
loss under the GPT-2 language model (Radford
et al., 2019), and errors identified by two online
grammar checking tools (scr; che). For example, on
attacks for the sentiment analysis task, the Scribens
grammar checker reports 15.63% errors per word
for Wallace et al. (2019), and only 9.38% errors
per word for our approach.
2 Related Work
Input-dependent attacks These attacks gener-
ate specific triggers for each different input to a
classifier. Jia and Liang (2017) fool reading com-
prehension systems by adding a single distractor
sentence to the input paragraph. Ebrahimi et al.
(2018) replace words of benign texts with tokens
whose word embeddings are close to that of the
original words using the direction of the gradi-
ent of the model’s loss, causing a drop in perfor-
mance. Similarly, Alzantot et al. (2018) propose
a word-replacing attack method based on genetic
algorithms. Zhao et al. (2018b) add adversarial per-
turbations to the latent embeddings of original text
and leverage a text generation model to construct
the final attack text.
Universal attacks Universal adversarial attacks
are input-agnostic and hence, word-replacing and
embedding-perturbing approaches are not applica-
ble. Wallace et al. (2019) and Behjati et al. (2019)
concurrently proposed to generate sequences of
words that can be added to any input text and fool
a target NLP model. Both papers perform gradient-
guided searches over the space of word embeddings
to choose optimal attack triggers. However, in both
cases, the generated attack word sequences are of-
ten meaningless, and can be easily detected by a
semantic checking process (as we show in Sec-
tion 4). In contrast, our goal is to generate attack
triggers that appear like natural phrases and retain
semantic meaning.
GANs for generating attacks Generative adver-
sarial networks (GANs) have also been explored for
adversarial attacks, particularly in computer vision.
Xiao et al. (2018) train a generator to adversarially
perturb input images to fool both the target im-
age classifier and the discriminator. Poursaeed et al.
(2018) consider both input-dependent and universal
attacks in the image domain by training a generator
to fool the target model without using the discrimi-
nator. Song et al. (2018) use a standard Auxiliary
Classifier GAN to synthesize images, which have
different predictions between the auxiliary classi-
fier and the target classifier. Zhao et al. (2018b)
leverage a GAN to manipulate an input’s latent vec-
tor and separately train an inverter to reconstruct
an adversarial example from that perturbed latent
vector. We use a GAN-based model (ARAE) for
generating attacks for models operating over text.
3 Universal Adversarial Attacks with
Natural Triggers
We build upon the universal adversarial attacks pro-
posed by Wallace et al. (2019). To enable natural
attack triggers, we use a generative model which
produces text using a continuous vector input, and
perform a gradient-guided search over this input
space. The resulting trigger, which is added to be-
nign text inputs, is optimized so as to maximally in-
crease the loss under the target classification model.
Problem Formulation Consider a pre-trained
text classifier F to be attacked. We are given a
set of benign input sequences {x} with the same
ground truth label y and the classifier has been
trained to predict F (x) = y. Our goal is to find
a single input-agnostic trigger, t that when con-
catenated2 with any benign input, causes F to per-
form an incorrect classification, i.e., F ([t;x]) 6= y,
where ; represents concatenation. In addition, we
also need to ensure the trigger t is natural fluent
text.
Attack trigger generation To ensure the trigger
is natural, fluent and carries semantic meaning,
we use a pre-trained adversarially regularized au-
toencoder (ARAE) (Zhao et al., 2018a) (details
in Section 4). The ARAE consists of an encoder-
decoder structure and a generative adversarial net-
work (GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The input
to the ARAE is a standard Gaussian noise vector
n, which is first mapped to a latent vector z by the
generator. Then the ARAE decoder uses this z to
generate a sequence of words – in our case, the
trigger t. This trigger is then concatenated with a
set of benign texts {x} to get full attack texts {x′}.
2We follow Wallace et al. (2019) in adding the triggers in
front of the benign text.
Figure 1: Overview of our gradient-based attack using
an ARAE model. Based on the gradient of the target
model’s loss function, we iteratively update the noise
vector n with small perturbation to obtain successful
and natural attack triggers.
The overall process can be formulated as follows:
z = GENERATOR(n),
t = DECODER(z),
x′ = [t;x].
(1)
We then pass each x′ into the target classifier and
compute the gradient of the classifier’s loss with
respect to the noise vector, ∇nL(F (x′), y). Back-
propagating through the decoder is not straightfor-
ward since it produces discrete symbols. Hence, we
use a reparameterization trick similar to the trick
in Gumbel softmax (Jang et al., 2017) to sample
words from the output vocabulary of ARAE model
as a one-hot encoding of triggers, while allowing
gradient backpropagation. Figure 1 provides an
overview of our attack algorithm, which we call
Natural Universal Trigger Search (NUTS).
Ensuring natural triggers In the ARAE model,
the original noise vector n0 is sampled from a stan-
dard multi-variant Gaussian distribution. While we
can change this noise vector to produce different
outputs, simple gradient search may veer signifi-
cantly off-course and lead to bad generations. To
prevent this, following some adversarial attack liter-
ature (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini and Wagner,
2017), we use projected gradient descent with a
l2 norm constraint to ensure the noise vector n is
always within a limited ball around the original
noise n0. We iteratively update n as:
nt+1 = ΠB(n0)[nt + η∇ntL(F (x′), y)], (2)
where ΠB(n0) represents the projection operator
with the l2 norm constraint B(n0) = {n | ‖n −
n0‖2 ≤ }. We try different settings of attack steps,
 and η, selecting the value based on the quality of
output triggers. In our experiments, we use 1000
attack steps with  = 10 and η = 1000.
Final trigger selection Since the generation pro-
cess is not deterministic, we initialize multiple inde-
pendent noise vectors and perform our updates (2)
to obtain many candidate triggers. Then, we re-
rank the triggers to balance both target classifier ac-
curacym1 (lower is better) and naturalness in terms
of the average per-token cross-entropy under GPT-
2, m2 (lower is better). In our experiments, we se-
lect the trigger with the minimum value of overall
performance score, which is defined as m1 + λm2,
as the output of searching algorithm. We select
λ = 0.05 to balance the difference in scales of m1
and m2.
4 Experiments
We demonstrate our attack algorithm on two differ-
ent tasks – sentiment analysis and natural language
inference. We employ the model of Wallace et al.
(2019) as a baseline and use the same datasets and
target classifiers for fair comparison. For the text
generator, we use an ARAE model pre-trained on
the 1 Billion Word dataset (Chelba et al., 2014).3
For both our attack (NUTS) and the baseline, we
limit the vocabulary of attack trigger words to the
overlap of the classifier and ARAE vocabularies.
Defense metrics We also employ three simple
defense metrics to measure the naturalness of at-
tacks:
1. Word frequency: The average frequency of
words in the attack trigger, computed using
empirical estimates from the training set of
the target classifier.
2. Language model loss: The average per-token
cross-entropy loss under a pre-trained lan-
guage model – GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019).
3. Automatic grammar checkers: We calculate
the average number of errors in the attack se-
quences using two online grammar checkers –
Scribens (scr) and Chegg Writing (che).
4.1 Sentiment Analysis
Setup The target classifier we consider uses
word2vec embeddings (Mikolov et al., 2013) and
3https://github.com/jakezhaojb/ARAE
NUTS (our model) Baseline (Wallace et al., 2019)
Task Trigger Test Trigger Classifier Trigger Classifierlength data accuracy accuracy
SST
No trigger
+ - 88.29% - 88.29%
- - 82.94% - 82.94%
3
+ why none of 45.27% drown soggy timeout 20.27%
- natural energy efficiency 23.60% vividly riveting soar 10.51%
5
+ a flat explosion empty over 26.35% drown soggy mixes soggy timeout 12.38%
- they can deeply restore our 18.46% captures stamina lifetime without prevents 6.30%
8
+ the accident forced the empty
windows shut down
27.25%
collapses soggy timeout energy energy
freshness intellect genitals
17.79%
- will deliver a deeply affected
children from parents
10.05%
sunny vitality blessed lifetime lifetime
counterparts without pitfalls
1.87%
SNLI
No trigger
+ - 90.95% - 90.95%
0 - 88.06% - 88.06%
- - 79.53% - 79.53%
3
+ she might not 1.02% alien spacecraft naked 0.00%
0 there is no 2.53% spaceship cats zombies 0.00%
- he could leave 54.58% humans possesses energies 46.55%
5
+ the new state won the 0.00% alien spacecraft nothing eat no 0.00%
0 there is no one or 1.82% cats running indoors destroy no 0.00%
- he is hoping to assess 39.93% mammals tall beings interact near 13.24%
8
+ i read the crowd about thepolice after 0.00%
mall destruction alien whatsoever shark
pasture picnic no
0.00%
0
the man drowned in hospital
and died in
3.74%
cats rounds murder pandas in alien
spacecraft mars
0.00%
- he is seen after training trips tohelp 26.08%
human humans initiate accomplishment
energies near objects near
22.76%
Table 1: Universal attack results on both the Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST) classifier and the Stanford Natural
Language Inference (SNLI) classifier. For SST, “+” and “-” represent test sentences with positive sentiment and
negative sentiment, respectively. For SNLI, “+” , “0”, and “-” represent test sentence pairs with entailment, neutral,
and contradiction relations, respectively. We report the model accuracy after adding the attack triggers to benign
test data (a lower accuracy means a more successful attack). ‘No trigger’ refers to classifier accuracy without any
attack. Compared to the baseline (Wallace et al., 2019), our attack triggers are slightly less successful at reducing
classifier accuracy but generate more natural triggers.
consists of a 2-layer long short-term memory
(LSTM) (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997), fol-
lowed by a linear layer for sentiment predictions.
The model is trained on the binary Stanford Senti-
ment Treebank (SST) (Socher et al., 2013), using
AllenNLP (Gardner et al., 2018). After training,
the classifier has an accuracy of 88.29% on positive
sentiment and an accuracy of 82.94% on negative
sentiment in the test data. To avoid generating
sentiment words in the attack trigger and directly
changing the real sentiment of the instance, we ex-
clude a list of sentiment words4 from the trigger
vocabulary, following Wallace et al. (2019).
Results The top half of Table 1 captures the re-
sults of both our attack and the baseline (Wallace
et al., 2019) with varied sentence lengths. For both
positive and negative instances, our method is able
to reduce the target classifier’s accuracy signifi-
4https://www.cs.uic.edu/˜liub/FBS/
sentiment-analysis.html
cantly, down to 10.05% in the best attack case.
Although this is still higher compared to (Wallace
et al., 2019)’s attack, we observe that our attacks
are much more natural, fluent and readable while
the baseline generates rare words (e.g., stamina)
and unnatural phrases (e.g. drown soggy timeout).
This is quantitatively portrayed in Figure 2,
which shows the difference in statistics between be-
nign text and each attack according to the metrics
of word frequency and GPT-2 loss. We see that our
generated attacks are much closer in these statistics
to the original text inputs than Wallace et al. (2019).
Further, as shown in Table 2, these two grammar
checkers (scr; che) report 9.38% and 21.88% er-
rors per word on our attack triggers, compared to
15.63% and 28.13% for Wallace et al. (2019).
4.2 Natural Language Inference
Setup For this task, we use the Stanford Natu-
ral Language Inference (SNLI) dataset (Bowman
et al., 2015) and the Enhanced Sequential Inference
SST SNLI
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
∆word frequency
baseline
SST SNLI
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
∆GPT-2 loss
our attack
Figure 2: Difference in (a) average word frequency
(normalized) and (b) average GPT-2 loss between be-
nign text (x) and different attack triggers (t) (length 5)
for SST and SNLI. All statistic differences are com-
puted as stat(x) − stat(t). For SNLI, we observe
that our generated attacks have lower GPT-2 loss values
than even the original text, leading to a positive delta.
Task Scribens Chegg Writing
Ours Baseline Ours Baseline
SST 9.38% 15.63% 21.88% 28.13%
SNLI 2.08% 4.17% 12.50% 20.83%
Table 2: Percentage of grammatical errors in the trig-
gers produced by our model (NUTS) and the base-
line (Wallace et al., 2019) according to two online
grammar checkers – Scribens (scr) and Chegg Writ-
ing (che).
Model (ESIM) (Chen et al., 2017) with GloVe em-
beddings (Pennington et al., 2014) as the classifier.
The classifier achieves scores of 90.95%, 88.06%,
79.53% for “entailment”, “neutral”, and “contra-
diction” categories, respectively. We attack this
SNLI classifier by adding the attack trigger to the
beginning of the hypothesis.
Results From Table 1, we see that our attack per-
forms similar to the baseline on entailment and
neutral examples. In fact, both attacks successfully
decrease the model’s accuracy to almost 0.00% on
both entailment and neutral examples with all trig-
ger lengths. On contradiction examples, our best
attack brings the model accuracy down to 26.08%
while the baseline brings it down to 13.24%. Al-
though our attacks are less successful on contradic-
tion, they are much more natural than the baseline.
In Figure 2, our attacks are closer to the word fre-
quency of benign inputs and even achieve a lower
GPT-2 loss than the original text. Further, as shown
in Table 2, two grammar checkers (scr; che) report
2.08% and 12.5% errors per word on our attacks,
compared to 4.17% and 20.83% for the baseline.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop universal adversarial at-
tacks with natural triggers for text classification
models. We leverage the ARAE text generation
model and propose a gradient-based approach to
search over attack triggers which are fluent and se-
mantically plausible. Experimental results on two
different classification tasks validate our approach
and show that our model can generate attack trig-
gers that are both successful and natural. Future
work can explore better ways to optimally balance
attack success and trigger quality, while also in-
vestigating more sophisticated ways of detecting
attacks.
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